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INTRODUCTION

Freedom of expression under the First Amendment includes
the right to anonymous expression.1 However, there are many
circumstances under which speakers do not have a right to
anonymity, including when they engage in defamation2 or when
they are providing testimony to a grand jury.3 This sets up a
complex set of tensions that raise important—and as yet
unresolved—questions regarding the scope of First Amendment
protections for anonymous speech.
At the core of these tensions are frameworks for determining
when online anonymous speakers should be “unmasked” so that
their true identities may be revealed. In civil litigation, courts in
cases involving allegedly defamatory4 posts on sites such as Yelp
have generally used approaches that, to varying degrees, aim to
balance the interests of plaintiffs seeking to identify defendants
in order to obtain redress with those of defendants who wish to
remain anonymous. But despite over two decades of adjudicating
such cases, courts have yet to settle on a standard.5
Furthermore, state legislatures have been reluctant to engage
with this issue. While Virginia and Washington D.C. have

1. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)
(holding that the First Amendment protects the right to anonymous expression
in relation to political speech).
2. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“[L]ibel
can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”).
3. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (“The power of
a federal court to compel persons to appear and testify before a grand jury
is . . . firmly established.”). More generally, of course, constitutionally
unprotected speech does not gain any extra protection simply by virtue of being
anonymous. For example, true threats (Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)),
incitements to imminent lawless action (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969)), copyright infringement, etc. are all unprotected, regardless of whether
a speaker is anonymous.
4. Of course, defamation is not the only form of unprotected speech that
arises in civil litigation involving unmasking demands. Another example is
copyright infringement, i.e., when a rights-holding plaintiff is attempting to
ascertain the identity of a person who has posted allegedly infringing material.
5. See infra Part III.
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statutes addressing procedures for unmasking,6 in the vast
majority of states unmasking is addressed in the absence of any
statutory framework.
This landscape has created both uncertainty and
inefficiency for over two decades. Uncertainty arises because
only a minority of jurisdictions have clear precedents,7 meaning
that both plaintiffs and parties arguing on behalf of anonymous
defendants have little ability to predict which of the many
possible approaches to unmasking a particular court will
ultimately decide to adopt.8 The lack of clarity also leads to
inefficiency, as state and federal trial and appellate courts
repeatedly grapple with variations on the same question of how
to balance a plaintiff’s interest in unmasking with the rights of
defendants or third parties to remain anonymous, often arriving
at different answers despite similar underlying fact patterns.
To further complicate matters, the question of what rules
should govern unmasking can also arise in criminal proceedings
in relation to grand jury investigations.9 In the only published
circuit court decision to date addressing this question, the Ninth
Circuit held in 2017 in In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 16-03217, United States v. Glassdoor10 (hereinafter Glassdoor) that
grand jury subpoenas seeking the identity of anonymous online

6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1; D.C. CODE § 16–5503. The D.C. statute is
narrow, applying only to claims “arising from an act in furtherance of the right
of advocacy on issues of public interest.” There is also a California statute (CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1987.2(c)) regarding unmasking, but it pertains only to the
issue of when a California court should award attorney’s fees and other
expenses incurred in moving to “quash or modify a subpoena from a court of this
state for personally identifying information” sought from an “interactive
computer service” in relation to “an action pending outside the state.”
7. Paul Alan Levy, Legal Perils and Legal Rights of Internet Speakers: An
Outline with Citations, 18–19, https://mkus3lurbh3lbztg254fzode-wpengine
.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/internetlegalrightsoutlineV3-2.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2021).
8. See infra Part III. As will be discussed, one of the few jurisdictions in
which there is a clear precedent is Delaware, where the Delaware Supreme
Court squarely addressed the unmasking issue in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451
(Del. 2005).
9. Of course, unmasking questions can also arise in relation to criminal
proceedings outside of grand jury investigations. The discussion herein, infra
Part III, focuses on grand jury investigations as that was the context for
Glassdoor.
10. 875 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 2017).
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speakers are valid so long as the investigation is conducted in
good faith.11
Previous scholarship on unmasking has primarily focused
on the civil context, expressing support12 or criticism13 for the
various tests articulated in civil cases for evaluating whether an
anonymous speaker’s identity should be revealed, suggesting
new ways for how these tests should be applied,14 highlighting
the lack of legislative attention this issue has received,15 and
asserting the need for Supreme Court guidance in order for
anonymous online speech to be adequately protected.16 With

11. Id. at 1990. Good faith is presumptively present in grand jury
proceedings, and thus has no direct analog in civil litigation, where the issue of
good faith can be examined, but it is not assumed. Thus, the question of whether
a grand jury proceeding is being conducted in good faith is very different from
the inquiry that some (but certainly not all) courts perform in relation to
unmasking demands in civil litigation regarding whether plaintiffs have a good
faith belief that they have been injured by legally actionable speech.
12. See, e.g., Taylor McMallman, The Shadow in the Comments Section:
Revealing Anonymous Online Users in the Social Media Age, 41 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 225, 246 (2019) (“The approach suggested by [the] Anonymous Online
[court] implicitly considers the type of speech at issue as a basis for revealing
the defendant’s identity . . . . If determining the [appropriate unmasking]
standard was based on the type of speech, the unpredictability that arises from
a wide-open value determination would be substantially reduced, if not cease to
exist.” (footnote omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Kelly Waldo, Signature Mgm’t Team LLC v. Doe: The Right to
Anonymous Speech Post-Judgment, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253, 276 (2018) (“The
[Signature Management] court’s formulation of . . . [a] presumption in favor of
unmasking does not show sufficient caution when deciding whether to reveal
an identity, a move from which there is no going back.”).
14. See, e.g., Nathaniel Plemons, Weeding Out Wolves: Protecting Speakers
and Punishing Pirates in Unmasking Analyses, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
181, 208 (2019) (“Currently, many courts that have confronted plaintiffs seeking
to unmask anonymous internet speakers have settled on either adopting or
adapting one of two analyses: the Dendrite or Cahill approach . . . . [N]either of
these approaches consider the strong legal basis for and overwhelming practical
importance of lowering the plaintiff’s burden to unmask anonymous
[intellectual property] infringers. The test that best balances plaintiff and
anonymous internet speaker interests is a Dendrite approach that implements
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the plaintiff in IP infringement cases.”
(footnote omitted)).
15. See, e.g., Ethan B. Siler, Yelping the Way to a National Statutory
Standard for Unmasking, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 189, 199–200 (2016)
(underscoring the limited attention that state legislatures have given this issue)
(footnote omitted).
16. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and
the Right to Anonymity, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 82 (2002) (“The failure of the
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respect to unmasking in relation to criminal proceedings, there
is a noteworthy gap in both case law and scholarship. Just a few
law review articles to date mention Glassdoor, and all only in
passing.17 And while there is some published commentary on
Glassdoor,18 there has been little legal scholarship devoted to
analyzing its implications in detail.
Court to be clearer on the foundations and standard for a right to anonymity
leaves a dangerous ambiguity when privacy and confidentiality are under
increased attack. Just as the Court succeeded recently in reinforcing the longneglected right of association, it was hoped that it would draw a bright line of
protection around anonymous speech. It may still do so . . . . [T]he Court is
inching closer to a clear and unambiguous recognition of anonymity, not as an
‘aspect’ or a ‘condition,’ but as a right of free speech and freedom of the press.”)
(footnote omitted).
17. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can
Carpenter Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 477 n.312
(mentioning Glassdoor as an example of how “[c]ourts moved to protect personal
privacy interests implicated by subpoenas issued to corporations” will “do so, if
at all, by ensuring the information is requested in good faith or tightening the
required showing of relevance—not by requiring a showing of anything
approaching probable cause”); Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot
Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 1022 n.215 (2019) (noting in their discussion of
why society should act cautiously when regulating bot speech that “[w]hile the
Ninth Circuit’s Glassdoor ruling has already been the subject of extensive
criticism for its failure to take the unique qualities of online speech into
account . . . it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will intervene”);
Barry Stricke, People v. Robots: A Roadmap for Enforcing California’s New
Online Bot Disclosure Act, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 839, 891 (2020) (citing
Glassdoor in analyzing California’s online bot disclosure act as an example of
when a third-party publisher was unable to block a subpoena to protect its
users’ anonymity).
18. See, e.g., Aaron Mackey & Sophia Cope, Appeals Court’s Disturbing
Ruling Jeopardizes Protections for Anonymous Speakers, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/11/appeals-courtsdisturbing-ruling-jeopardizes-protections-anonymous-speakers (“The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Glassdoor, Inc. is a significant setback for the First
Amendment.”); Brian Kulp, US v. Glassdoor: Ninth Circuit Compels Website to
Disclose Anonymous Users’ Identities, JOLT DIGEST (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/us-v-glassdoor-ninth-circuit-compelswebsite-to-disclose-anonymous-users-identities (“The setback for anonymity of
online speech could have a wide-reaching impact as the [Glassdoor] decision
sends ripples out from the Ninth Circuit.”); Minda Zetlin, Federal Court Will
Decide—in Secret—Whether to Unmask Anonymous Glassdoor Reviewers, INC.
(Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/federal-court-is-deciding-insecret-whether-onli.html (lamenting the fact “that [the Glassdoor]
decision . . . [was] being made behind closed doors” and that the public would
potentially “not know anything about it until well after the decision ha[d] been
made”); Lisa A. Hayes, Anonymous Speech Online Dealt a Blow in U.S. v.
Glassdoor Opinion, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 8, 2017),
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Against this backdrop, there is also another recent and
concerning development: As part of the broader discussion about
potential new regulation of social media companies, proposals
have been made in Congress and in the pages of the Wall Street
Journal to mandate banking industry-style identity verification
to users creating new accounts on social media services.19 While
these proposals target the process of creating accounts on social
media companies, as opposed to using accounts to post
pseudonymously, they are clearly intended to make it easier for
plaintiffs to unmask the people behind pseudonymous postings
deemed problematic.
Given that the Supreme Court has confirmed that both
online speech20 and anonymous speech21 are protected by the
First Amendment, state or federal legislation aimed specifically
at undermining the ability to speak anonymously online would
clearly run into constitutional challenges. But the fact that such
proposals are even being contemplated demonstrates both the
timeliness and importance of greater attention in the legal
academic press to online anonymous speech.
To that end, this Article articulates a set of approaches that
would enable far more clarity, consistency, and balance than has
heretofore been present in court proceedings involving
unmasking demands. With respect to civil litigation, the Article
provides an overview and comparison of the approaches

https://cdt.org/blog/anonymous-speech-online-dealt-a-blow-in-us-v-glassdooropinion (“If [Glassdoor] stands, it will have far-reaching consequences for the
ability of companies to protect anonymous speech online.”).
19. See, e.g., Andy Kessler, Online Speech Wars Are Here to Stay, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 24, 2021, 5:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/online-speech-warsare-here-to-stay-11611526491 (suggesting legislation should compel social
media companies to follow “know your customer” requirements inspired by
analogous requirements in the financial industry); see also Ron Johnson
(@SenRonJohnson),
TWITTER
(Jan.
26,
2021,
4:04
PM),
https://twitter.com/SenRonJohnson/status/1354218776670203905
(“One
solution may be to end user anonymity on social media platforms. Social media
companies need to know who their customers are so bad actors can be held
accountable.”).
20. Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (holding that
the First Amendment protects online speech).
21. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning
omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom
of speech protected by the First Amendment.”).
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articulated to date, arguing that the best approach is a prima
facie standard inspired by a 2001 New Jersey court ruling
(Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe No. 3),22 but augmented by a
more specific balancing test based on a set of three factors: (1)
the type of speech at issue; (2) whether the anonymous speaker
is a party to the litigation; and (3) the comparative harms that
would result from making an incorrect unmasking decision.
The Article also analyzes unmasking in grand jury
proceedings, endorsing the approach used by the Western
District of Wisconsin in In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Amazon.com Dated 7, 2006.23 In that decision, the court
fashioned a filtering mechanism to limit the power and scope of
a government subpoena, protecting the First Amendment rights
of anonymous Amazon customers while still giving the
government the ability to identify witnesses for its
investigation.24 This approach is more protective than that used
in Glassdoor and comports more properly with the underlying
First Amendment considerations that arise (though in different
form) in both civil and criminal proceedings.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II
provides an overview of the technological aspects of how users’
digital communications platforms and services are unmasked
and also briefly notes some pre-digital-era precedents regarding
anonymous speech. Part III presents a table and discussion
comparing various approaches to unmasking in civil litigation.
It then provides an analysis of the Glassdoor decision and its
implications. Part IV presents recommendations for addressing
unmasking in civil (and separately) criminal cases. Conclusions
are presented in Part V.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. THE TECHNOLOGY OF UNMASKING
While the term “anonymous” is often used (including in this
Article) to describe online postings in which publishers wish to
hide their identity, as a strictly technical matter such postings
are nearly always pseudonymous. True anonymity is extremely
difficult to achieve online. Far more commonly, people who wish

22. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
23. 246 F.R.D. 570 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
24. Id.
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to keep their identities private publish under pseudonyms, or
use websites like Techdirt that do not require users to register
before posting comments. The information necessary to tie a
pseudonym to the person behind it is generally (though not
always) available in the internal logs of the communications
services and devices used for the publication.
Consider what happens when reviewers post reviews on
Yelp of businesses they have frequented. Reviewers can publish
using screen names that may have little or no clear connection
to their real names. But that connection can nonetheless be
made through a combination of information from one or more of
Yelp, an internet service provider, a mobile phone company, and
the device used by the user.25 Each time a user of Yelp (or of any
other online service) signs on and engages with the service,
records are created that can typically identify the person and or
the device that made the connection.
For instance, consider a person posting to Yelp from a laptop
computer connected to a wireless network located in a
workplace. When connected to the internet, the laptop computer
will be associated with a public26 internet protocol (IP) address
known to the internet service provider. This association is often
indirect. It is common for businesses (and homes, etc.) to receive
internet service using a particular public IP address used for
communication from an internet service provider to a router

25. Cf. Cale Guthrie Weissman, What is an IP Address and What Can It
Reveal about You?, INSIDER (May 18, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/ip
-address-what-they-can-reveal-about-you-2015-5 (describing what an IP
address does and does not reveal).
26. The term “public” here does not mean that any member of the public
could look up the IP address online and trace it to a specific home or business
address. Rather, it means that the fact that a given IP address is among those
used by a particular internet service provider (ISP) would be a matter of public
record, though the specific way in which an ISP chooses to allocate IP addresses
to its customers is not generally public. See Tim Fischer, What is a Public IP
Address?, LIFEWIRE (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-publicip-address-2625974. However, the information to tie a particular IP address to
a particular street address typically is available within the ISP’s own internal
records, and thus accessible to litigants through legal process. See Weissman,
supra note 25 (describing an instance “where the authorities, knowing only the
IP address, contacted the ISP and were able to find the identity of a person
sending harassing emails”).
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located in a particular building.27 Within a company or
residence, there is often also an internal, private network that is
used to allow multiple devices to connect to the router, and from
there to the internet.28
In the case of a user posting to Yelp from a laptop computer
on a company wireless network, Yelp would know the username
(and other account information) of the user as well as the IP
address being used to communicate with the user. Even if the
user were to register for a Yelp account by providing a false name
and an e-mail address created for the sole purpose of facilitating
anonymous posting to Yelp, the communications with Yelp
would still be traceable using the IP address to a particular
router. That router in turn would often be associated with a
private subnetwork of devices internal to the company. Within
that subnetwork, each device would have its own unique address
known to the router, though not to the ISP.
In this scenario, identifying a particular laptop computer
used to communicate via a company wireless network with Yelp
would, from a technological standpoint, require several steps.
The first step would involve obtaining from Yelp the IP address
and therefore the location of the router being used for the
communications. The second step could involve obtaining
records from within the router. These records would provide
device address data for the internal (to the company) network
and time stamps to identify the specific laptop computer used in
the Yelp posting.29
And in the scenario above, there is an additional way that
the user’s identity might be ascertained: Suppose that the user
27. See Weissman, supra note 25 (“Routers, instead, connect to individual
computers, and it’s the routers that then connect to the rest of the internet using
their own individual IP address.”).
28. See id. (“Think of routers as the bridge between the network within
your house (or business, library, coffee shop, etc.) and the outside world network
(that is, the internet).”).
29. The foregoing description is exemplary, but by no means limiting. There
are many other variations on how devices such as laptop computers connect to
the internet. For instance, virtual private networks add an additional layer of
complexity. In addition, there are many wireless networks (such as those in
airports, restaurants, and public buildings) in which identifying the specific
person who accessed the internet using the network could be more difficult.
However, unless an internet user has gone to significant lengths to
electronically mask their identity, it is usually possible, given sufficient access
and resources, to identify which specific computer was used in relation to
internet activity that has come under scrutiny.
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created a special e-mail address to use only for posting to Yelp.
The fact of creating and using that address would also facilitate
identification. For instance, if the user creates and uses a custom
Gmail account for this purpose, a subpoena to Google would
reveal information about the IP address(es) used to create and
utilize the associated e-mail address—and from there it would
often be fairly straightforward to identify the individual behind
the e-mail account.
Of course, there are also tools available for people wishing
to hide their online identity by thwarting the technological
unmasking approaches described above. Tor, for example, is a
browser that intentionally promotes anonymity by routing
internet traffic through a series of intermediary nodes so that
the web site being accessed (e.g., Yelp) only knows the identity
of the node in the chain that it directly communicates with—and
does not know the identity of the upstream nodes, including the
computer of the Tor user.30 Alternatively, or in addition, a user
might choose to register for and access an online service using a
mobile phone specifically procured for anonymity (i.e., a phone
for which there is no database at a mobile network company
tying the user to the phone).31
When anonymity-conferring tools such as Tor or “burner”
mobile phones are used, unmasking involves both legal and
technical barriers. Even if a court concludes that a user posting
to the internet via Tor should be unmasked, it would not know
who to name in an order to actually do the unmasking. An
additional complication is that many of the nodes in a Tor
network may be overseas, raising jurisdictional challenges.32
However, the overwhelming majority of internet users do not go
to such lengths to remain anonymous. This Article therefore
focuses on unmasking as a legal question, while also recognizing
30. Aliya Chaudhry, How to Use the Tor Browser’s Tools to Protect Your
Privacy, THE VERGE (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/21/2113
8403/tor-privacy-tools-private-network-browser-settings-security.
31. This mobile phone scenario assumes that the user would access the
internet only using the cellular network, as using nearby Wi-Fi access points
would lead to the same unmasking procedures described in the previous
paragraphs.
32. From a strictly legal standpoint, the use of overseas servers to provide
electronic communication with a U.S. user provides a nexus that might resolve
the jurisdictional question. But that would still leave the practical challenge of
obtaining information from these servers.
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that there are circumstances where a court ordering unmasking
could also face technological hurdles.
Most of the case law on unmasking has arisen in civil
litigation. This is a direct consequence of the enormous growth
in online platforms that allow users publicly identified only by
pseudonyms to publish on the internet, and the resulting
expansion in the amount of content hosted by such sites.
To take one example, Yelp was founded in 2004.33 It was
home to one million reviews by 2007, 100 million reviews by
2016, and 200 million reviews by 2019.34 Between Q4 2019 and
Q4 2020, the total number of reviews on Yelp grew by 19 million,
corresponding to about 52,000 new reviews per day.35 Given that
volume, it is inevitable that some owners of businesses reviewed
on Yelp will conclude, rightly or wrongly, that they have been
defamed. It is also inevitable that some subset of them will
choose to pursue litigation, knowing that unmasking a
defendant is a necessary step to succeed on a claim.
Yelp is far from the only web site that hosts content that
might lead to an unmasking demand. Twitter is another such
site.36 Twitter users have enormous latitude in choosing their
“handles”—that is, the username by which the account is
publicly known. Some Twitter accountholders choose handles
that unambiguously identify the owners of the account—for
example, handles like @nytimes and @elonmusk leave no doubt
about who actually owns an account. But some Twitter users
post using handles that do not convey the identity of the account
owner. When tweets from such accounts lead to legal action,
unmasking becomes a key goal of the litigation.37

33. Fast Facts, YELP, https://www.yelp-press.com/company/fast-facts/defau
lt.aspx (last visited February 23, 2021).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Facebook, on the other hand, requires accountholders to use their real
names. See What Names are Allowed on Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/112146705538576 (last visited Nov. 17, 2021)
(“The name on your Facebook account should be the name that your friends call
you in everyday life. This name should also appear on an ID or document from
our ID list.”).
37. To take one example, in 2019 Rep. Devin Nunes (R-CA) filed a
defamation claim in a Virginia court naming (among other defendants,
including Twitter) the owners of two Twitter accounts, identified in the
complaint only by their handles. Complaint, Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. C49-
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While unmasking demands are a common feature of online
defamation cases, they can also arise in relation to allegations of
trademark infringement, breach of confidentiality obligations,
copyright infringement, and more. The content in question is
often published through internet services such as Yelp and
Twitter that host third-party postings, but can also be published
through other mechanisms, e.g., by a defendant publishing
through its own web site.
B. ANONYMOUS AND ONLINE SPEECH
Anonymous speech has played a vital role since (and before)
the founding of the United States. As Allison Hayward has
written: “From the United States’ earliest days, speakers
addressing controversial public questions have sought
anonymity. The authors of the Federalist Papers, which
supported ratification of the Constitution, published under the
pseudonym Publius, and the revolutionary-era pamphleteers
had published under assumed names, often to escape
prosecution.”38
The right to anonymous expression is closely tied to another
right grounded in, though not explicitly stated in, the First
Amendment: that of free association.39 Association involves
1715 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/nunes-complaint.pdf. The complaint anticipated that
unmasking would be a part of the litigation, stating that “[t]he Twitter attacks
on Nunes were pre-planned, calculated, orchestrated, and undertaken by
multiple individuals acting in concert, over a continuous period of time
exceeding a year. The full scope of the conspiracy, including the names of all
participants and the level of involvement of donors and members of the
Democratic Party, is unknown at this time and will be the subject of discovery
in this action.” Id. at *23. In June 2020, a judge ruled that Twitter was shielded
by Section 230 from liability for posts by its users. Brian Fung, Nunes Cannot
Sue Twitter Over Accounts Posing as his Mother and a Cow, Judge Rules, CNN
(June 24, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/24/politics/devin-nunes-twitterlawsuit-cow/index.html; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (protecting online platforms
from liability for content users post to their platforms).
38. Allison Hayward, Anonymous Speech, THE FIRST AMEND.
ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 2017), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/32
/anonymous-speech.
39. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576,
578–79 (1971) (“We held in [Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964)] that the First Amendment guarantees of free speech,
petition, and assembly give railroad workers the right to cooperate in helping
and advising one another in asserting their rights under the [Federal
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discourse, and in some cases may involve discourse among
persons who wish to keep their identities hidden from nonparticipants, and sometimes even from each other as well.40 As
such, pre-digital analogs to contemporary unmasking questions
often arose through government attempts to compel disclosure
of associational relationships.
In the mid-20th century, the Supreme Court issued a series
of decisions stemming from McCarthy-era investigations by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities and from broader
government investigations of the NAACP’s civil rights advocacy.
In Watkins v. United States,41 NAACP v. Alabama,42 and Bates
v. Little Rock,43 the Court blocked the government’s attempts to
compel disclosures of membership lists. On the other hand, in
Barenblatt v. United States,44 the Court sided with the
government after Barenblatt was held in contempt of Congress
for refusing to disclose information regarding whether he and
another person were members of the Communist Party.45
All of these cases addressed a form of unmasking, though
not in the digital context in which it most commonly occurs
today: The government sought to obtain the identities of people
who, through their association with one another, were engaged
in activities—including expression—that the government
deemed concerning. Their identities were sought primarily
because of government interest in the organizations to which
they belonged. In other words, it was the fact of their
membership, not the authorship of any particular published
statement, that the government wished to ascertain.

Employers’ Liability Act]. While not deciding every question that possibly could
be raised, our opinion left no doubt that workers have a right under the First
Amendment to act collectively to secure good, honest lawyers to assert their
claims against railroads.”).
40. For instance, as will be discussed in more detail infra, consider a
Facebook group for persons who have a particular rare medical condition.
Anonymity allows participants in the group to retain their medical privacy—
including from one another—while still benefiting from being members of that
online community.
41. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
42. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
43. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
44. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
45. Id. at 113–15.

90

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

This contrasts with the frequently encountered form of
unmasking in the digital era, where a plaintiff in a civil case, or
the government in a criminal case, is attempting to connect the
dots between public online expression and the non-public
identity of the person who authored it. Contemporary cases are
thus different from those of the mid-twentieth century, as they
often involve speakers who have elected to speak publicly under
the protections of anonymity that digital technology can
facilitate and that an adverse party seeks to use the legal system
to remove. And while the growth of online expression has
changed many things, it has not changed the underlying fact
that such speech is presumptively protected: In Reno v. ACLU,46
a 1997 decision arising from a challenge to the Communications
Decency Act (CDA),47 the Court struck down much of the CDA
and offered a broader conclusion regarding the scope of online
freedom of expression: “[O]ur cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium.”48
The landscape regarding online anonymity will also be
influenced by Americans for Prosperity Foundation (AFPF) v.
Bonta, Attorney General of California, a 2021 Supreme Court
decision that addressed a related but different issue,
associational privacy rights in relation to information collected
by the government about charitable donors.49 AFPF arose out of
a challenge to a California law requiring tax-exempt charities to
submit confidential lists of their major donors’ names and
addresses.50 The AFPF contended that this requirement violates
freedom of association rights as recognized in NAACP v.
Alabama.51 California argued that the requirement is necessary
to prevent fraud.52 In finding for AFPF, the Court wrote “[w]e
are left to conclude that the Attorney General’s disclosure

46. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
47. The CDA was Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)).
48. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
49. 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021).
50. Id. at 2379–80.
51. Brief for Petitioner at 1, 2, AFPF v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (No.
19-251), 2021 WL 722924, at *1, *2.
52. Brief for Respondent at 1, AFPF v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (No.
19-251, 19-255), 2020 WL 7345503, at *4.
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requirement imposes a widespread burden on donors’
associational rights . . . . We therefore hold that the up-front
collection of [donor information] is facially unconstitutional.”53
While this decision addressed disclosures to the government in
relation to charitable giving, the Court’s strong support for
associational privacy rights will undoubtedly influence lower
courts in future online unmasking cases.
Finally, it is important to note that the right to anonymous
speech is not monolithic; rather, some forms of speech, and
therefore some forms of anonymous speech, get more protection
than others. The McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission Court
gave a nod to these variations in 1995 when it wrote in relation
to “core political speech” that “[n]o form of speech is entitled to
greater constitutional protection.”54 By contrast, there is less
protection for anonymous commercial speech,55 that is
defamatory,56 infringes copyright,57 or violates criminal law. For
instance, a state can criminalize incitement to imminent lawless
action, or the making of certain threats, without running afoul
of the First Amendment.58

53. AFPF, 141 S. Ct. at 2389.
54. 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
55. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
56. Of course, a defendant can only be held liable for defamation of a public
or private figure if he or she made the statements at issue with the requisite
mental state. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(holding that a public official can only recover for defamation if the statements
were made with “actual malice”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974) (broadening the “actual malice” standard to encompass public figures,
not just public officials).
57. Copyright infringement is most often addressed through civil litigation,
though it is also addressed through criminal statutes. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §
506(a).
58. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that
speech advocating illegal activity is punishable only if it is “directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 875.
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III. ONLINE UNMASKING APPROACHES
A. UNMASKING IN CIVIL LITIGATION
While there are many examples of recent litigation
involving unmasking, some of the most-used approaches were
created in rulings dating from the early growth years of the
internet, as that is when courts first began grappling with
complaints filed against defendants known only by online
pseudonyms. Courts in recent years have consistently looked to
(but have not always adopted the approaches used in) these
early cases as they fashion their own responses to demands by
plaintiffs to unmask defendants.
1. Comparing Civil Unmasking Standards
The table below provides an overview and comparison of the
standards most commonly articulated in civil cases that have
been relied on by courts, and also includes the Virginia
unmasking statute.59 The statute and standards are listed in
order of least protective of anonymous speech to most
protective.60

59. An analogous, though less detailed, table was provided in Daniel J.
Solove & Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Media, in PRIVACY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS 1, 9-10 (3d ed. 2017). We have not included the D.C. or
California statutes in this table because, as explained earlier (see supra note 6),
the D.C. statute applies only to claims regarding “the right of advocacy on issues
of public interest,” and the California statute does not provide a standard for
unmasking, and is instead limited only to the issue of attorney’s fees.
60. All of the cases detailed in this table deal with unmasking in the
discovery context. By contrast, the Sixth Circuit recently addressed postjudgment unmasking in Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831 (6th
Cir. 2017). The court explained that at this stage, there is a presumption in
favor of unmasking similar to the presumption of access to judicial records and
that courts “must consider both the public interest in open records and the
plaintiff’s need to learn the anonymous defendant’s identity in order to enforce
its remedy.” Id. at 837. The court outlined factors weighing in favor of
unmasking—namely, if the expression reaches a large number of people, if it
concerns a well-known or public figure, if it is not protected (e.g., defamatory),
and if the plaintiff needs to enforce an ongoing injunction. Id. Factors weighing
against unmasking include “engag[ing] in substantial protected speech that
unmasking would chill” and if a defendant named in an unmasking demand has
already “willingly participated in litigation and complied with all relief
ordered.” Id.
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UNMASKING STANDARDS: CIVIL LITIGATION
Case/Statute

Standard

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1
(2002):

Identity

of

Persons

Communicating Anonymously Over
the Internet

Showing That the Conduct May
Be Tortious or Illegal
The

Virginia

statute

requires,

among other things, showing “that one or
more communications that are or may be
tortious or illegal have been made by the
anonymous communicator, or that the
party requesting the subpoena has a
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that
such party is the victim of conduct
actionable in the jurisdiction where the
suit was filed.”61

In re Subpoena Duces Tecum
to America Online, Inc.62 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 2000) (America Online)

Good Faith
A
ordered

third-party
to

platform

unmask

an

can

be

anonymous

defendant if:
(1) “the court is satisfied by the
pleadings or evidence supplied to that
court[;]
(2) . . . the

party

requesting

the

subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis
to contend that it may be the victim of
conduct actionable in the jurisdiction
where suit was filed[;] and
(3)

the

subpoenaed

identity

information is centrally needed to advance
that claim.”63
Columbia Insurance Co. v.
Seescandy.com64 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(Seescandy.com)

Motion to Dismiss
To

unmask

an

anonymous

defendant, the plaintiff must:
(1) Identify the missing party with
“sufficient specificity;”

61. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2002).
62. 52 Va. Cir. 26, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on
other grounds, 542 S.E.2d. 377 (Va. 2001).
63. Id. at *8.
64. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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(2) “identify all previous steps taken
to locate the elusive defendant” in order to
ensure that they made “a good faith effort
to comply with the requirement of service
of process and specifically identifying
defendants;”
(3) establish that the suit can
survive a motion to dismiss; and
(4) file a discovery request, showing
the “limited number of persons or entities”
who

will

be

served

and

why

the

information sought is necessary.65
Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc.66
(W.D. Wash. 2001) (2TheMart.com)

Between Motion to Dismiss and
Prima Facie
In determining if it should grant or
deny a motion to quash a subpoena, the
court considers whether:
“(1)

the

subpoena

seeking

the

information was issued in good faith and
not for any improper purpose,
(2) the information sought relates to
a core claim or defense,
(3) the identifying information is
directly and materially relevant to that
claim or defense, and
(4)

information

sufficient

to

establish or to disprove that claim or
defense is unavailable from any other
source.”67
Some
standard

courts

have

appropriate

found
when

this
the

anonymous speaker is not a party to the
suit.68

65. Id. at 578–80.
66. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
67. Id. at 1095.
68. See, e.g., Rich v. Butowsky, Case No. 20-mc-80081-DMR, 2020 WL
5910069 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09–3031–CV–S–GAF,
2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009); Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751
F. Supp. 2d 782 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
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Speakers69

Anonymous
(9th

Cir.
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Online

Court suggests that the nature of

2011)

speech should dictate what standard

(Anonymous Speakers)

applies.70 In so doing, it rejects a broad
application of Cahill (see below).

Doe v. Cahill

71

(Del. 2005)

(Cahill)

Summary Judgment
To

unmask

an

anonymous

defendant:
(1) The plaintiff “must introduce
evidence creating a genuine issue of
material fact for all elements of a
defamation claim within the plaintiff’s
control[;]”72 and
(2) to the extent possible, “the
plaintiff must undertake efforts to notify
the anonymous poster that he is the
subject of a subpoena or application for
order of disclosure . . . [and must] withhold
action to afford the anonymous defendant
a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the discovery request.”73
Highfields

Capital

Management, L.P. v. Doe74 (N.D.
Cal. 2005) (Highfields)

Prima Facie
In determining if it should grant or
deny a motion to quash a subpoena, the
court considers whether:
(1) There is a “real evidentiary basis”
for believing that the speaker “engaged in
wrongful conduct that has caused real
harm[;]”75 (This means “the plaintiff must
adduce

competent

evidence—and

the

evidence plaintiff adduces must address
all of the inferences of fact that plaintiff
would need to prove in order to prevail

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1177.
884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
Id. at 463 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 460–61.
385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Id. at 975.
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under at least one of the causes of action
plaintiff asserts.”)76
(2) (If the answer to #1 is yes) the
“magnitude of the harms that would be
caused to the competing interests by a
ruling in favor of plaintiff and by ruling in
favor of defendant.”77
Highfields

is

quite

similar

to

Dendrite (below), though—in contrast
with Dendrite—it does not require notice
to the defendant or a separate step
showing that the plaintiff can survive a
motion to dismiss.78 It does, however, ask
the court to engage in a similar, vague
balancing
District

analysis.79
of

The

California’s

Northern

(where

many

unmasking cases have arisen) tends to use
Highfields as opposed to Dendrite.80
Dendrite International, Inc. v.

Prima Facie

Doe No. 381 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001) (Dendrite)

To

unmask

an

anonymous

defendant:
(1) The plaintiff must “undertake
efforts to notify the anonymous posters
that they are the subject of a subpoena or
application for an order of disclosure,” and
the court must “withhold action to afford
the

fictitiously-named

defendants

a

reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the application[;]”82

76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 976.
78. Compare id. at 974–81 (analyzing unmasking without requiring notice
or showing the ability to survive a motion to dismiss), with Dendrite Int’l, Inc.
v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (requiring notice
and a showing of the ability to survive a motion to dismiss).
79. Highfields, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 980–81.
80. See, e.g., Tokyo Univ. of Soc. Welfare v. Twitter, Inc., No. 21-MC-80102DMR, 2021 WL 4124216, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2021) (applying Highfields).
81. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
82. Id. at 760. The court explained that this notification effort “should
include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to the
anonymous user on the ISP’s pertinent message board.” Id.
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(2) the plaintiff must present the
specific statements that are purportedly
actionable;83
(3) the plaintiff must establish “that
its action can withstand a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted[;]”84
(4)
sufficient

“the

plaintiff

evidence

must

produce

supporting

each

element of its cause of action, on a prima
facie basis[;]”85 and
(5) if the “court concludes that the
plaintiff has presented a prima facie cause
of action,” it must weigh the defendant’s
First Amendment right of anonymous
speech with the strength of the evidence
presented against him and the need for
disclosure to allow the plaintiff to proceed
with his cause of action.86

2. Clarifying the Terminology
Courts—and therefore the table above—use terminology
such as “good faith,” “prima facie,” “motion to dismiss,” and
“summary judgment” as a shorthand to convey the varying
burdens that different courts have placed on plaintiffs seeking
unmasking. While convenient, these terms also mask
complexities and risk oversimplifying what in fact are
approaches that cannot be fully categorized with a single term.
For instance, while both Highfields and Dendrite are in the
prima facie category, they involve significantly differing
procedural steps.
There can also be potential confusion as two of these
terms—motion to dismiss and summary judgment—actually
refer to the need for a plaintiff to provide sufficient information
to survive a hypothetical motion (i.e., a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment, respectively) made by an
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 760–61.
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opposing party. There is no requirement in these standards that
such a motion actually be made and ruled on; rather the terms
are used to convey the level of robustness that must be present
in the claim in order for unmasking to proceed.87 By contrast,
evaluating “good faith” does not require considering what an
opposing party might argue to defeat a motion, but it does, by
definition, require consideration of the state of mind of the
plaintiff. An additional complexity arises because “prima facie”
in this context can mean different things. For instance, Dendrite
requires not only that the court make the binary (i.e., yes or no)
assessment of whether the plaintiff has presented a prima facie
case, but if that assessment is made in the affirmative, also that
the court evaluate the strength of the prima facie case.88
It is also important to note that certain—though not all—
claims underlying unmasking requests require a mental state
analysis. For example, to prove defamation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant acted negligently or (if the
defendant is a public figure) with actual malice.89 However, as
emphasized in Cahill, plaintiffs charged with making a prima
facie showing to support their unmasking requests are not
required to prove their “case as a matter of undisputed fact”90—
instead, they have to present sufficient evidence “for all
elements of a defamation claim within plaintiff’s control.”91 This
is because courts recognize that before discovery, plaintiffs may
not have access to information that would allow them to prove
the defendant’s mental state since the defendant’s identity is
unknown.92 If the court grants the unmasking request, the
87. Id. at 767–68 (“[P]laintiff should establish to the Court’s satisfaction
that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573,
579 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
88. Id. at 760–61.
89. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
90. Best W. Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL
2091695, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006).
91. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005) (emphasis in original).
92. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 2006 WL 2091695, at *5 (“[A] plaintiff at an early
stage of the litigation may not possess information about the role played by
particular defendants or other evidence that normally would be obtained
through discovery. But . . . [the] plaintiff must produce such evidence as it has
to establish a prima facie case of the claims asserted in its complaint.”). A recent
case illustrates how an anonymous speaker’s mental state may be evaluated
without knowledge of his or her identity. In Kennedy v. Kos Media, Senator
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plaintiff can then engage in discovery to seek the evidence
necessary to prove the mental state element of the claim.93
3. The Evolution of Unmasking Standards
When unmasking requests for online content started
becoming more common in the early days of widespread internet
adoption, courts initially adopted approaches that were highly
deferential to the parties seeking disclosure. Seescandy.com and
America Online were some of the earliest cases to consider this
issue. Adopting the motion to dismiss94 and good faith
standards95 respectively, these courts allowed plaintiffs to
prevail on their unmasking requests without having to make
any evidentiary showing of the strength of their underlying
claims.96
Following (though not necessarily as a direct result of) the
America Online ruling, the Virginia state legislature signed an

Robert F. Kennedy Jr. filed a petition for pre-action disclosure against a news
site seeking to unmask an anonymous blogger who posted on the site about
Kennedy’s appearance at a rally in Germany. Motion to Quash at 8, Nos. 20210370 & 2021-04476 (N.Y. App. Div. Dept. 2), https://mkus3lurbh3lbztg254fzodewpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/Motion-to-quash-memo-decls-89-final-version.pdf. Kennedy sought the blogger’s identity so that he could
pursue a defamation claim. Id. The blogger moved to quash, arguing that
Kennedy could not show that any factual statements at issue were false and
could not provide clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Id. at 20. The
blogger contended that a showing of actual malice was necessary in this case
since Kennedy was, at least, a limited purpose public figure, and that such a
showing could be “predicated on proving that the blog post [at issue] was so far
different from what various sources in the mainstream media were saying about
the protest that [the blogger] must have known that the blog post was wrong.”
Id. at 25.
93. There may be instances when, based on publicly available information,
a plaintiff can prove the defendant’s mental state without knowing their
identity. For instance, consider a Twitter user who tweets an intention to
knowingly spread false information via Twitter—and who then proceeds a few
days later to do exactly that.
94. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 580–81 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
95. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26,
2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 542
S.E.2d. 377 (Va. 2001).
96. It is important to note that, while the motion to dismiss standard
established by the Seescandy.com court requires no evidentiary showing, in the
case itself the court actually did consider evidence offered by the plaintiff.
Seecandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579–80.
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unmasking bill into law in April of 2002.97 The Virginia
unmasking statute is even more plaintiff-friendly than America
Online. It provides that a plaintiff can meet the requirements for
unmasking by either showing he or she has “a legitimate, good
faith basis to contend” that he or she is a “victim of conduct
actionable” or by showing communications that “may be tortious
or illegal.”98 This is a hurdle so low that it is hardly a hurdle at
all. The statute is arguably99 constitutionally suspect, as it
confers to plaintiffs the power to unmask defendants using a
threshold that is insufficiently protective of the right to
anonymous speech.
While the Virginia statute remains on the books, courts in
other jurisdictions have generally concluded that the judicially
created good faith and motion to dismiss standards were

97. H.D. 819, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002). The summary of the bill
states that it “[p]rovides a procedure governing certain subpoenas in civil
proceedings where it is alleged that an anonymous individual has engaged in
tortious Internet communications. This bill is a recommendation of the Study
on the Discovery of Electronic Data and has been endorsed by the Judicial
Council.” 2002 Session: H819 Identity of Persons Communicating Anonymously
Over the Internet, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgibin/legp604.exe?021+sum+HB819S (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2002): This statute was at the center of a
2015 Virginia Supreme Court case considering a subpoena served on Yelp by a
business owner alleging defamation. Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc.,
770 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 2015). The court held that the “circuit court was not
empowered to enforce the subpoena duces tecum against Yelp[.]” Id. at 441.
99. There are important and as yet unresolved legal questions of whether
the government violates the Constitution when it creates a statute authorizing
a private party to take an action that, if taken by the government, would be
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]hether a private
party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the Government for Fourth
Amendment purposes necessarily turns on the degree of the Government’s
participation in the private party’s activities.” Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs.
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989). An analogous line of reasoning would
presumably apply to the First Amendment. With regard to unmasking under
the Virginia statute, it could be argued that the government is not a participant
at all (because the litigation is between private parties), or, alternatively, that
the government is very much a participant (through having created a process
that directly undermines the ability to speak anonymously). The issue of the
constitutionality of laws authorizing private actions also arose in 2021 in United
States v. Texas, a Supreme Court case considering a Texas law permitting
private citizens to sue (and if successful, recover damages from) anyone who
“aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion.” S.B. 8, 87th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (to be codified as Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 171.203(b),
171.204(a)).
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inadequate in light of First Amendment concerns, and have
instead formulated more stringent approaches. For example, in
Dendrite,100 a New Jersey appellate court created what one legal
scholar has described as “the first test that maintained national
traction.”101 The Dendrite standard requires a plaintiff to: (1)
provide notice to the defendant, (2) identify the allegedly
actionable statements, (3) establish a claim sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss, and (4) produce evidence sufficient to
establish a prima facie cause of action.102 An additional key
aspect of the Dendrite standard relates to what occurs once the
plaintiff has satisfied the four prongs above: The court must
balance the interests of the anonymous speaker and the strength
of the plaintiff’s case to determine whether unmasking is
proper.103
In Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted a modified
version of Dendrite.104 This standard still requires the plaintiff
to attempt to notify the defendant and to provide evidence
sufficient to satisfy the “prima facie or ‘summary judgment
standard.’”105 However, the court found the second Dendrite
prong (the identification of actionable statements) to be
“subsumed in the summary judgment inquiry” and also
concluded that the separate balancing analysis is unnecessary
since, in the view of the Cahill court, “the summary judgment
test is itself the balance.”106 Courts have varied in their
application of Dendrite and Cahill, with some adopting
Dendrite’s express balancing step107 and others following
Cahill’s process.108 Courts and scholars have expressed differing

100. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
101. Plemons, supra note 14, at 196.
102. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760–61.
103. Id.
104. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
105. Id. at 460 (quoting Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 769).
106. Id. at 461.
107. See In re Ind. Newspapers, Inc., 963 N.E.2d 534, 552 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456–57 (Md. 2009);
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
108. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 245–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008);
In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
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views about whether Cahill or Dendrite is more demanding and
protective of speech.109
While Dendrite and Cahill have been used extensively,110
some courts have adopted other approaches. For example, in Doe
v. 2TheMart.com, Inc. (2001)111 a federal district court in
Washington State created a four-part test for evaluating
whether to grant a civil subpoena to unmask an anonymous
poster who was not a party to the litigation.112 The court
explained that “non-party disclosure is only appropriate in the
exceptional case where the compelling need for the discovery
sought outweighs the First Amendment rights of the anonymous
speaker.”113 Highfields114 is another important case in the
unmasking landscape, having established what is essentially
the Northern District of California’s slimmed down version of
Dendrite: a two-part prima facie standard that requires the
party seeking unmasking to make a strong evidentiary showing
and the court to balance the strength of the claim with First
Amendment interests.

109. Compare In re PGS Home Co. Ltd., No. 19-mc-80139-JCS, 2019 WL
6311407, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (asserting that Cahill created “the most
exacting standard” for unmasking), and Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d
249, 255–56 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting that Cahill is “difficult for a plaintiff to
satisfy” and opting to use the prima facie standard adopted by Dendrite and
other courts because it “strikes the most appropriate balance” between the
parties), and McMallman, supra note 12, at 247 (explaining that Cahill is more
defendant-friendly than Dendrite), with Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231,
243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the Cahill court felt that “[t]he
Dendrite test . . . required too much”), and Plemons, supra note 14, at 209
(“[C]ourts that utilize the Cahill approach are far more likely to grant discovery
into the speaker’s identity than those that implement Dendrite.”).
110. See Plemons, supra note 14, at 196 (“[J]urisdictions typically adopt one
of two approaches: either the Dendrite or Cahill test.”); Kelly Waldo, Signature
Mgm’t Team LLC v. Doe: The Right to Anonymous Speech Post-Judgment, 19
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253, 267 (2018) (citing Dendrite and Cahill as examples of
prominent cases in which courts have expanded upon the “pioneering test from
Seescandy.com”).
111. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
112. Id. at 1095–97.
113. Id. at 1095; see also In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168,
1176 (explaining that the 2TheMart.com court “drew from seescandy.com and
America Online, but recognized that a higher standard should apply when a
subpoena seeks the identity of an anonymous Internet user who is not a party
to the underlying litigation”).
114. 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
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In 2011, the Ninth Circuit became one of the earliest federal
appellate courts115 to address online unmasking,116 but its
decision created more questions than answers. In Anonymous
Speakers,117 the Ninth Circuit rejected a broad application of
Cahill after cataloguing the various unmasking standards and
stating that “Cahill’s bar extends too far.”118 The court wrote
that instead of uniformly applying the Cahill standard, “the
nature of the speech should be a driving force in choosing a
standard by which to balance the right of anonymous speakers
in discovery disputes,”119 with commercial speech getting less
First Amendment protection than literary, religious, or political
speech.120 Since Anonymous Speakers, there remains little
clarity about what unmasking standard is appropriate for what
type of speech.
B. UNMASKING IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Far less attention has been paid to unmasking in the
criminal context, and more particularly to unmasking in relation
to grand jury investigations.121 This may be because subpoenas
115. The prior year, in 2010, the Second Circuit considered unmasking in a
case addressing mass downloading. See Arista Records v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110,
119 (2d. Cir. 2010).
116. Philip L. Gordon & Christopher M. Leh, Ninth Circuit Provides Some
Relief for Employers and Executives Anonymously Trashed on the Web, LITTLER
(July 23, 2010), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ninthcircuit-provides-some-relief-employers-and-executives.
117. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011).
118. Id. at 1177.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. While the discussion herein focuses on grand jury proceedings,
unmasking also arises in relation to criminal investigations. For instance, in In
re Facebook, Inc. v. U.S., a Washington D.C. court authorized search warrants
for two individual Facebook accounts and one Facebook page that the
government had probable cause to believe contained evidence regarding unrest
in Washington on the day of President Trump’s inauguration. Order, Nos. 17
CSW-658, 659, 660 (2017), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads
/facebookwarrantfinalorder_0.pdf (last accessed Nov. 18, 2021). These warrants
would permit the government to obtain the identifying information and private
communications of both the accountholders and innocent third parties
associated with the accounts. Id. at 13–15. The account holders moved to
intervene and challenge the warrants. Id. at 2. Acknowledging that these
warrants threatened to undermine associational privacy and anonymous
speech rights, the court created procedural safeguards to narrow their scope.
Id. at 9, 12. Some of these safeguards included requiring the government to
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requesting the identity of an online speaker issued during the
course of grand jury investigations would generally be kept
confidential, making it impossible to know how commonly it
occurs. There are currently few cases in the public record
specifically addressing this point.122
Federal grand jury proceedings are generally required to be
kept secret.123 State grand jury proceedings generally are as
well, although laws vary about the extent of this

submit its search protocol to the court for review, redact identifying information
of third parties who communicated on Facebook Messenger with the accounts
or pages in question, and delete any data obtained during the search that did
not fall within the scope of the warrant. Id. at 13–15.
122. In addition to Glassdoor discussed herein, see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena No. 11116275, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying a motion
to quash a government subpoena to unmask a Twitter user who threated to
“engage in sadomasochistic activities” with then-presidential candidate Michele
Bachmann); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued to Twitter, Inc., No. 3:17-MC40-M-BN, 2017 WL 9485553, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-MC-40-M-BN, 2018 WL 2421867 (N.D. Tex.
May 3, 2018) (recommending that the court grant in part and deny in part
Twitter’s motion to quash an unmasking subpoena seeking the identity of five
users who the government suspected were either involved in cyberstalking or
had information relevant to the government’s investigation of a cyberstalking
suspect). In addition, a 2012 California district court case dealt with a motion
to quash a subpoena from the SEC to Google to identify the owner of an
anonymous Gmail account. Doe v. United States Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, No. MC
11-80184 CRB, 2012 WL 78586, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012). The owner of
the account moved for a protective order or stay of the subpoena pending his
appeal, and the court denied the motion. Id. at *1, *6. This is a civil case (since
the SEC is an administrative agency, it cannot bring criminal charges on its
own). However, the SEC often partners with the FBI in related criminal
investigations, raising an evidentiary question about whether the information
obtained during the SEC investigation could later be used by the government
in a related criminal case.
123. See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:6 (2d
ed. 2020) (“The traditional principle of grand jury secrecy is still generally
observed in federal proceedings . . . .”).
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requirement.124,125 Thus, it might be argued that the secret
nature of grand jury proceedings is protective of the right to
anonymous speech of people whom a grand jury seeks to
unmask. After all, unmasking the identity of a formerly
anonymous speaker only to members of a grand jury is certainly
less invasive of privacy than unmasking the speaker to the
public.
But that argument misses the point that any unmasking,
even to a limited group, removes anonymity and creates a risk
of more widespread disclosure, whether inadvertent (e.g., if
documents that were supposed to remain under seal are
compromised via human error or a cybersecurity flaw) or
intentional (e.g., if the unmasked speaker is a witness who is
subsequently compelled to testify in open court at a trial). While
grand juries are not ubiquitous, they are a common feature of
the landscape at both the federal and state level.126
Some state criminal courts have grappled with the issue of
anonymous online speech outside of grand jury proceedings. But
in contrast with civil litigation, where a plaintiff typically seeks
the identity of an anonymous online speaker, state criminal
courts have often considered the issue in the inverse, when a
124. For example, California Penal Code § 938.1 permits grand jury
testimony to be revealed if a defendant is indicted. CAL. PEN. CODE § 938.1(a)
(West 2003). The transcript of the testimony becomes accessible to the public 10
days after it has been delivered to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 938.1(b). Missouri’s Sunshine Law authorizes records related
to a law enforcement investigation to become public once the investigation is
inactive. MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.100 (West 2020). Although Missouri has
multiple statutes requiring grand jury proceedings to be kept secret, none of
them explicitly exempt the proceedings from the Sunshine Law’s requirements.
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 540.310, 540.320, 540.110, 540.120; see also Joseph E.
Martineau et al., Grand Jury Records–Can the Public Get Them?, LEWIS RICE
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.lewisrice.com/publications/grand-jury-recordscan-the-public-get-them/ (“While Missouri, like most other states, has statutes
creating secrecy in grand jury proceedings, nothing in the grand jury statutes
in Missouri changes the Sunshine Law’s presumption of openness, even for the
portions of the investigative files presented to the grand jury.”).
125. The right to a grand jury has not been incorporated. See Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (holding the right to indictment by a grand jury
has not been incorporated against the states).
126. Nicole Smith Futrell, Visibly (Un)just: The Optics of Grand Jury
Secrecy and Police Violence, 123 DICK. L. REV. 1, 22 (2018) (“While
‘nearly all state constitutions provided for indictment by grand jury in the early
nineteenth century,’ not all states actually make use of grand juries.” (footnotes
omitted) (citations omitted)).
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litigant already known to the court seeks to challenge an
affirmative prohibition on anonymous online activity. Such
prohibitions can arise through requirements for sex offender
registries127 or through laws addressing computer crimes.128
Thus, state criminal cases have often focused not on
articulating a procedure for unmasking, but rather on questions
such as whether context-specific prohibitions on anonymous
online activity are constitutional. There are also federal and
state criminal proceedings that include unmasking of the
identity of online speakers who are unambiguously engaging in
unprotected speech—a circumstance that raises no need for any
sort of balancing test. For instance, in November 2015, several
people used the anonymity-conferring social networking app Yik
Yak to issue threats of imminent, racially-targeted violence at
the University of Missouri.129 They were quickly unmasked and
arrested.130
Another potential reason for the paucity of federal criminal
cases in the public record dealing with unmasking requests may
be the Stored Communications Act (SCA).131 The SCA, which

127. Multiple state criminal courts have considered the constitutionality of
statutes requiring convicted sex offenders to provide identifying information
like their email addresses and usernames on particular sites to government
registries, just as they are required to provide information like their phone
numbers and home addresses. See, e.g., People v. Minnis, 67 N.E.3d 272, 279,
291 (Ill. 2016) (holding that Illinois’ Sex Offender Registration Act requiring
“sex offenders to disclose and periodically update information regarding their
Internet identities and websites” survives intermediate scrutiny); Ex parte
Odom, 570 S.W.3d 900, 905–16 (Tex. App. 2018) (affirming that the “Texas Sex
Offender Registration Program’s requirement that convicted sex offenders
register [their] internet identifiers . . . does not burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the State’s legitimate interests”).
128. See, e.g., Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 443 (Va. 2008) (detailing a
Virginia Supreme Court decision involving a defendant convicted of violating a
provision of Virginia’s Computer Crimes Act for providing false routing
information when disseminating unsolicited bulk emails).
129. Sarah Larimer, University of Missouri police arrest suspect in social
media death threats, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/grade-point/wp/2015/11/11/universityof-missouri-police-arrestsuspect-in-social-media-death-threats/.
130. Id.
131. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986). The ECPA included the SCA, which was codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701–12.
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was enacted in 1986 and is now widely viewed as outdated,132
provides the government with mechanisms to access both
“records concerning”133 (i.e., metadata of) electronic
communications as well as the “contents of”134 those
communications. Unmasking inquiries will typically target the
metadata, since the goal will often be to identify the person who
posted one or more messages for which the contents are already
public.
Unmasking in criminal cases implicates both First and
Fourth Amendment issues. While the Supreme Court in
Carpenter v. United States135 found the SCA provision with
respect to warrantless access to metadata to be unconstitutional,
that holding was extremely narrow, applying only to metadata
in the form of cell site location information.136 In any case,
Carpenter left intact the portion of the SCA that allows law
enforcement to obtain this information with a warrant.137 Thus,
before a grand jury investigation even begins, law enforcement
investigators can (with a warrant as needed) use the SCA to
identify an anonymous speaker, and then bring that information
to a grand jury. Of course, this raises a separate question of
whether the SCA is constitutionally problematic with respect to
the First Amendment when used for this purpose. The upshot is
that the jurisprudence is far sparser with respect to unmasking
in criminal cases than in civil litigation. This is why Glassdoor
is such an important—and we believe, concerning—precedent.
1. Glassdoor
Glassdoor is a website that provides a platform for
individuals to post anonymous reviews about their employers.138
Glassdoor requires people wishing to post reviews to register
their e-mail addresses with the site, though there is no

132. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010)
(finding unconstitutional the portions of the SCA permitting the government to
access the contents of electronic communications without a warrant).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
135. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
136. Id. at 2220.
137. Id. at 2220–23.
138. United States v. Glassdoor, Inc., 875 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2017).

108

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

requirement that the e-mail address convey the name of the
person who controls it.139
In March 2017, the government subpoenaed Glassdoor,
ordering it to unmask over 100 users who had posted anonymous
reviews of a government contractor under investigation by an
Arizona federal grand jury for wire fraud and misuse of
government funds.140 Glassdoor objected, invoking its users’
First Amendment rights.141 In response, the government
narrowed its request to eight users142 who the government
considered “witnesses to certain business practices” pertinent to
the investigation.143 Glassdoor filed a motion to quash, arguing
that the government had not met its burden under the
compelling interest test articulated in Bursey v. United States,144
a 1972 Ninth Circuit decision in which the court partially
quashed a grand jury subpoena to identify the anonymous
publishers of a Black Panther Party newspaper that was critical
of the United States government.145 By contrast, the government

139. See id. (“[T]o post reviews, users must first provide Glassdoor with their
e-mail addresses . . . .”).
140. Id. at 1182–83. The name of the company was redacted in the published
opinion. Id.
141. Id. at 1183.
142. Id.
143. Id; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 16-03-217, at 2 (D. Ariz.
May 10, 2017) (on file with author). This order has since been sealed, so is
inaccessible on legal databases but has been circulated online.
144. 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972). In Bursey, the Ninth Circuit established
a three-part test that the government must satisfy when seeking information
that implicates First Amendment rights in the course of a grand jury
investigation. Id. at 1083. This test requires the government to establish that
(1) its “interest in the subject matter of the investigation is ‘immediate,
substantial, and subordinating;’” (2) a “substantial connection” exists “between
the information [the government] seeks . . . and the overriding governmental
interest in the subject matter of the investigation;” and that (3) its “means of
obtaining the information” are “not more drastic than necessary to forward the
asserted governmental interest.” Id. Notably, the court emphasized that while
the “grand jury is an arm of the judiciary, rather than an appendage of other
branches of Government” it is “bound by the Constitution” just as much as “its
governmental coordinates[.]” Id. at 1082. Accordingly, “it would be anomalous
for courts to protect First Amendment rights from infringement by other
branches of Government, while providing no such protection from the acts of
judicial agencies over which the courts have supervisory as well as
constitutional powers.” Id.
145. Glassdoor, 875 F.3d at 1182, 1187–88. See generally Bursey, 466 F.2d
1059.
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contended that under Branzburg v. Hayes,146 Glassdoor was
obligated to comply with the subpoena unless it could
demonstrate that the government acted in bad faith when
making the request.147
After the district court denied Glassdoor’s motion to quash
the subpoena, Glassdoor appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed the district court’s decision.148 The Ninth Circuit’s
analysis focused on two questions: first, whether the Glassdoor
users in question had a right to associational privacy, and
second, whether the statements made in the reviews were
protected speech, and if so, whether that status was sufficient to
block a grand jury subpoena.149
The court found the associational privacy argument to be
“tenuous,” stating that this right did not protect those “who
happen to use a common platform to anonymously express their
individual views” and that “Glassdoor’s users are necessarily
strangers to each other, because they are anonymous.”150 Having
(improperly in our view, as discussed later herein)151 rejected the
associational privacy claim, the Ninth Circuit then turned to the
question of whether the reviews were protected speech.152 The
court answered this question in the affirmative, but then went
on to find Branzburg controlling—i.e., because there was no
evidence that the government requested the subpoenaed
information in bad faith, Glassdoor had to comply.153
The court found that subjecting the government to the more
stringent compelling interest test from Bursey would burden
146. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Supreme Court held in Branzburg that
reporters have “no First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer the relevant
and material questions asked during a good-faith grand jury investigation.” Id.
at 708. It found “no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement
and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the
consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering that is said to result
from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions”
during a “valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial”—even if this means
revealing the criminal conduct, or evidence thereof, of the reporter’s source. Id.
at 690–92.
147. Glassdoor, 875 F.3d at 1182. See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
148. Glassdoor, 875 F.3d at 1182–83.
149. Id. at 1183.
150. Id. at 1184.
151. Infra Part IV.A.2.
152. Glassdoor, 875 F.3d at 1184.
153. Id. at 1189–90.
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grand jury proceedings, concluding that even if the compelling
interest test applied, “[a]ny incidental infringement on
Glassdoor’s users’ First Amendment rights is no more drastic
than necessary to vindicate those compelling interests.”154 But
despite articulating such a lopsided, government-friendly
approach for unmasking in the course of grand jury
investigations, Glassdoor has generated surprisingly little
commentary.155
2. Grand Juries and Unmasking
What are the implications of Glassdoor for anonymous
online speech of interest in grand jury proceedings? To answer
that question, it is helpful to briefly provide context regarding
the role of grand juries more generally. While grand juries are
not used in all federal criminal cases, they are used in relation
to charges for crimes for which the consequences for conviction
are particularly severe156—or, in the language of the Fifth
Amendment, “infamous.”157
As Gabriel J. Chin and John Ormonde explain in a 2018 law
review article, “[u]nder the current rules, felonies must be
154. Id. at 1189–91.
155. Only a handful of law review articles to date cite Glassdoor, and all of
them mention it only in passing. Evan Caminker, in an article on the long-term
implications of Carpenter v. U.S, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) on modern privacy
doctrine and digital privacy protections, mentions Glassdoor as an example of
how “[c]ourts moved to protect personal privacy interests implicated by
subpoenas issued to corporations” will “do so, if at all, by ensuring the
information is requested in good faith or tightening the required showing of
relevance—not by requiring a showing of anything approaching probable
cause.” Evan H. Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter
Build a Stable Privacy Doctrine?, SUP. CT. REV. 411, 477 n.312 (2019). Madeline
Lamo and Ryan Calo note in an article about why society should act cautiously
when regulating bot speech that “[w]hile the Ninth Circuit’s Glassdoor ruling
has already been the subject of extensive criticism by First Amendment
advocates for its failure to take the unique qualities of online speech into
account . . . it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will intervene.”
Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988,
1022 n.215 (2019). And Barry Stricke, in an article on California’s online bot
disclosure act, mentions Glassdoor as an example of when a third-party
publisher was unable to resist a subpoena to protect its users’ anonymity. Barry
Stricke, People v. Robots: A Roadmap for Enforcing California’s New Online Bot
Disclosure Act, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 839, 891 (2020).
156. Gabriel J. Chin & John Ormonde, Infamous Misdemeanors and the
Grand Jury Clause, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1911, 1911–12 (2018).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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prosecuted by grand jury indictment, but a misdemeanor may be
based on a charge in a prosecutor’s information or even a ticket
issued by a law-enforcement officer with no further review.”158
Thus, many federal crimes are charged without a grand jury
indictment.
As the grand jury clause of the Fifth Amendment has never
been incorporated against the states,159 states have adopted a
patchwork of different approaches. As described by LeFave et
al., as of 2020, eighteen states guaranteed those accused of
serious crimes the right to an indictment by a grand jury.160 Four
other states were considered “limited indictment jurisdictions,”
where prosecution by indictment is guaranteed only in cases
involving “the most severely punished felonies”— those
punishable by life imprisonment or the death penalty.161 In
contrast, twenty-eight states allowed for felony prosecutions by
information rather than grand jury indictment.162 These
“information states” technically leave open the option to

158. Chin & Ormonde, supra note 156, at 1911–12 (internal citations
omitted). Chin and Ormonde further argue that the felony/misdemeanor
distinction is the wrong place to draw the line, as “many misdemeanors are
infamous because they authorize imprisonment or carry stigmatizing
consequences” and that using the felony/misdemeanor categorization for
determining whether a crime is “infamous” undermines defendants. Id. at 1949.
159. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (listing
“the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury indictment requirement” as one of “the only
rights not fully incorporated”); see also 2 SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW,
FED. GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 24:1 (2d ed. 2020)
(explaining that “States are . . . free (i) to rely solely on the grand jury, (ii) to
reject it for charges initiated by a prosecutor and preliminary hearings to
determine probable cause,” which is also called prosecution by information, “or
(iii) to rely on a combination of both”).
160. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.1(d) (4th ed.
2020). While these “indictment states” differ “in their description of the offenses
as to which a defendant may insist upon a grand jury accusation,” all of these
descriptions “add up to requiring a grand jury charge for offenses meeting the
traditional definition of felonies.” Id. Furthermore, on these jurisdictions, if a
defendant is prosecuted on information, convicted, and timely raises an
objection, the conviction will automatically be reversed. Id.
161. Id. § 15.1(e). In Louisiana and Rhode Island, the accused has a right to
indictment by a grand jury when charged with offenses punishable by life
imprisonment or the death penalty. Id. Florida guarantees the right to an
indictment by a grand jury only in capital cases, and Minnesota, having
abolished the death penalty, guarantees the right only in cases involving
charges that could result in life imprisonment. Id.
162. Id. § 15.1(g).
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prosecute by a grand jury indictment, but in many states “this
option is entirely or largely theoretical.”163 Other information
states generally only impanel indicting grand juries for major
investigations.164 And in the remaining information states,
whether such indictments actually occur depends heavily on
prosecutorial discretion and accordingly varies not just by state
but by “prosecution district . . . within the same state.”165
It is also important to underscore that grand juries actually
perform two tasks166 that potentially interact differently with
the unmasking question. First, a grand jury investigates crimes
and identifies person(s) suspected of committing them.167
Second, a grand jury determines whether there is sufficient
evidence to indict the accused.168 This dual function of the grand
jury has been referred to “as both shield and sword.”169

163. Id. For example, Nebraska only authorizes an indicting grand jury if
requested by citizen petition or in cases involving death caused by law
enforcement. Id. at n.356.30. Pennsylvania allows individual counties to
eliminate the indicting grand jury by petitioning the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court “to approve a system of prosecution by information in that court.” See
BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:5. And Connecticut has eliminated the
indicting grand jury altogether. See CHRISTOPHER REINHART, CONN. GEN.
ASSEMB., OLR RESEARCH REPORT: CONNECTICUT GRAND JURIES (Sept. 3, 1998),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/PS98/rpt%5Colr%5Chtm/98-R-1101.htm
(“On
November 24, 1982, Connecticut adopted a constitutional amendment to repeal
the requirement of a grand jury indictment before a person can be tried for any
crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, and to require, instead, a
probable cause hearing.”).
164. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:5.
165. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 160, § 15.1(g).
166. See, e.g., BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:7 (noting that grand juries
perform “two interrelated but distinct functions”).
167. Id. Investigative grand juries are still relied on in information states,
though infrequently. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 160, § 14.2(d) n.47.50
(“Even when the grand jury continues to be used for investigations, that use
may be so infrequent as to have gaps of more than a decade between grand
juries.”).
168. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 160, § 14.2(d) n.47.50. This
determination is made (or rejected) after a prosecuting authority has “made a
definite accusation of criminal conduct against a particular person.” BEALE ET
AL., supra note 123, § 1:7.
169. See, e.g., BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:7 (“A colorful metaphor is
used to describe these dual functions: the grand jury acts as both shield and
sword.”).
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In its investigative capacity, a grand jury has broad
powers.170 The Supreme Court explained in United States v. Real
Enterprises in 1991 that a grand jury is free to “investigate
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.”171 Indeed, a grand jury
investigation is only complete when “every available clue has
been run down and all witnesses [have been] examined in every
proper way to find if a crime has been committed.”172 The rules
of evidence do not apply to grand jury proceedings—even
unlawfully obtained evidence can be used.173 The grand jury’s
power, however, is not limitless. While “[i]t may consider
incompetent evidence . . . it may not itself violate a valid
privilege, whether established by the Constitution, statutes, or
the common law.”174
Furthermore, the power of the grand jury to issue subpoenas
and compel the production of evidence is broad, and can be
enforced through contempt proceedings.175 Grand jury
subpoenas to produce documents are rarely struck down for
irrelevance,176 no doubt in part because subpoenaed parties are

170. See, e.g., Eugene R. Scheiman, Grand Jury Subpoenas and First
Amendment Privileges, 446 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 108 (1979)
(explaining that a grand jury has “almost unfettered powers”).
171. 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The R. Enterprises Court also wrote that such investigations are “not fully
carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses
examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
172. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
173. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
174. Id.
175. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:7 (explaining that grand jury
subpoenas are “subject to few restrictions, and if a witness refuses to testify or
produce evidence, the grand jury may invoke the court’s contempt power to
compel compliance with its subpoena.”).
176. See 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 104 (4th ed. 2021) (“In U.S. v. R. Enterprises, the
Supreme Court said that while grand juries may not engage in fishing
expeditions, ‘the law presumes, absent a strong showing to the contrary, that a
grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority,’ and that therefore,
‘a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be
reasonable, and the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the
recipient who seeks to avoid compliance.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
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not provided with contextual information that would allow them
to evaluate the relevance of the information being sought.177
In contrast with investigations, which provide few
protections (thus the “sword” in the “sword and shield” metaphor
mentioned above), an indicting grand jury178 exists, at least in
theory, to protect the due process rights of those under
investigation, ensuring that citizens vote on whether or not to
bring charges, rather than allowing the government to
unilaterally make such decisions.179
3. Glassdoor’s Overreliance on Branzburg
By providing a precedent that is binding in the Ninth
Circuit and will likely be highly influential elsewhere, Glassdoor
is concerning for multiple reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit relied
on Branzburg—a 1972 decision that focused on limits on the
rights of journalists to protect their sources and is only partially
analogous to Glassdoor.180 As was made evident by the
information conveyed in the news articles that attracted the
government’s attention in Branzburg, the reporters’ sources
whom the government sought to identify were by definition
people with highly specific knowledge bearing on the alleged
crimes the government was investigating.181
177. See id. (“In considering whether a motion to quash a subpoena satisfies
the R Enterprises test, at least one court has said that the district judge may
only look to the categories of information sought in the subpoena itself; it is
improper to make a document-by-document evaluation of relevancy. Given the
secrecy of the grand jury’s proceedings, it will be the rare case that a subpoena
recipient will be able to make such a showing.”).
178. A single grand jury will often both investigate and indict, but will be
called an investigatory or indicting grand jury depending on what function it is
serving. See generally BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:7 (explaining that when
a grand jury is “investigating whether crimes have been committed and, if so,
who committed them” it “is often referred to as an investigative grand jury,”
and when a grand jury is determining “whether there is sufficient evidentiary
support to justify holding the accused for trial on each charge . . . [it] is called
an indicting grand jury”).
179. Beale et al. explain that this enables a grand jury to “shield the accused
from criminal charges even though there is an adequate evidentiary basis
if . . . [it] conclude[s] that the charges are improperly motivated or unjust.”
BEALE ET AL., supra note 123, § 1:7.
180. See United States v. Glassdoor, 875 F.3d 1179, 1185–91 (9th Cir. 2017)
(applying Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
181. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667–70 (describing two instances where a
reporter published articles that included details of anonymous drug users).
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By contrast, the speakers in Glassdoor were engaged in
casual online conversations that left far more uncertainty
regarding how much they actually knew of the alleged crimes,
and how much of that knowledge might have been based on
hearsay.182 This is an important difference, as any balancing test
weighing the interests of the government against those of the
people it seeks to unmask surely should favor the anonymous
speakers more heavily when there is such a high degree of
uncertainty regarding the value of the information the
government would obtain through the unmasking.
Furthermore, Branzburg focused on whether the First
Amendment protects a journalist’s newsgathering activities,
which is related to but distinguishable from the right of a
journalist’s confidential sources to speak anonymously. In
Branzburg, the reporters had actively sought out and published
information from confidential sources relevant to a specific
criminal investigation. In contrast, Glassdoor merely provides a
platform for users to post all types of information related to their
employment experiences. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should
have focused on the First Amendment protections afforded to the
anonymous speakers in Glassdoor, not on whether the platform
itself was or was not entitled to something analogous to a
reporter’s privilege. As the D.C. District Court noted in 2009 in
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible Violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 et seq., the Branzburg Court concluded that the First
Amendment rights of the journalists were not implicated by the
subpoenas at issue, and accordingly it did not consider “whether
the substantial relationship [test] would be the appropriate
standard of review for a subpoena implicating First Amendment
interests.”183
Second, by relying on Branzburg and simply requiring that
the government act in good faith, the Ninth Circuit makes it far
too easy to successfully subpoena any internet service to obtain
identifying information about its users. Online speakers are
more likely to be hesitant to post anonymously if they know that
182. See Glassdoor, 875 F.3d at 1182–83 (“As of March 2017, current and
former employees of the subject company had posted 125 reviews on
Glassdoor.com. Many of the reviews criticize the subject’s management and
business practices.”).
183. In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461
et seq., 706 F. Supp. 2d 11, 19 (D.D.C. 2009).
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the government will be able to unmask them if anything they
say later becomes even loosely related to a criminal
investigation. And, as explained above, the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings can sometimes be temporary. The public sometimes
gains access to transcripts of federal184 and state grand jury
proceedings after the proceedings themselves have concluded.185
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GRAND JURIES AND UNMASKING
The Glassdoor court’s choice to base its decision solely on
Branzburg is highly concerning. A more appropriate approach
would view Branzburg as a non-dispositive minimum hurdle to
be cleared. It is certainly the case that as the Branzburg Court
concluded, grand juries that are operating in good faith deserve
a degree of deference in their activities. However, the fact that
an investigation is being done in good faith should not remove
constitutional protections from people whose activities come
under scrutiny.
What should be done to ensure that the free expression
rights of anonymous speakers, who are not typically aware of a
grand jury’s desire to unmask them,186 are given appropriate
weight? Making the burden too high would run afoul of the Real
Enterprises Court’s admonition that “[a]ny holding that would
saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings
would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the
public’s interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the
184. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3) outlines circumstances
under which a court may disclose federal grand jury matters to those not
involved in the proceeding. For example, a court may authorize the disclosure
of a grand jury matter in connection with a judicial proceeding. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(3)(E)(i).
185. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law § 190.25 (McKinney) (“Grand jury
proceedings are secret, and no grand juror, or other person specified in
subdivision three of this section or section 215.70 of the penal law, may, except
in the lawful discharge of his duties or upon written order of the court, disclose
the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony, evidence, or any decision,
result or other matter attending a grand jury proceeding.”).
186. It is also possible to imagine circumstances in which anonymous users
might be made aware of attempts to unmask them. As noted earlier this
occurred, for example, in Cahill in which a defendant was notified of the
unmasking demand and filed a motion aimed at preventing it. Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005).
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criminal laws.”187 But a burden that fails to consider the rights
of the anonymous online speakers is also insufficient. Just as a
grand jury is, as the Supreme Court has written, “without power
to invade a legitimate privacy interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment,”188 it should similarly be powerless to invade
legitimate First Amendment interests.
It is important to highlight the Branzburg concurrence from
Justice Powell—whose vote was indispensable to the
majority189—which emphasized “the limited nature of the
Court’s holding.”190 He explained that if a journalist subpoenaed
to reveal confidential source information believes that the
information is only remotely related to the investigation or that
law enforcement has no “legitimate need” for the source’s
identity, the journalist can seek a protective order from the court
or file a motion to quash.191 Justice Powell further stressed that
decisions about whether to compel disclosure should be
determined on a case-by-case basis that balances each citizen’s
duty to testify in a criminal investigation with First Amendment
interests.192
Justice Powell’s concurrence has been influential,193
although mostly in the context of civil, not criminal cases. Faced
187. United States v. Real Enters., 498 U.S. at 298–99 (citing United States
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
188. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
189. See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[T]he
Branzburg result appears to have been controlled by the vote of Justice
Powell.”); Dalitz v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 473 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) (“It is the view of this court that Branzburg v. Hayes . . . cannot
legitimately be read without regard to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Powell . . . as his vote was necessary to that decision.”).
190. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the court’s ruling does not seek to deprive subpoenaed
newsmen of their constitutional rights “with respect to the gathering of news or
in safeguarding their sources”).
191. Id.
192. Id. (“The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of
all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”).
193. Laura R. Handman, Protection of Confidential Sources: A Moral, Legal,
and Civic Duty, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 573, 577 (2005)
(“Many courts interpreting Branzburg have held that Justice Powell’s opinion,
prescribing a balance of First Amendment and law enforcement interests, is
controlling.”); see also Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
593 F.2d 1030, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wright, Chief J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts
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with motions to compel disclosure in civil cases, multiple circuits
have adopted a three-part balancing test based on his
proposition, which requires courts to consider: (1) whether the
information the reporter is seeking to protect is relevant, (2)
whether the information can be obtained through alternative
means, and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the
information.194 Notably, while this test has mostly been applied
only in the civil context, the Second Circuit requires a moving
party in both civil suits and criminal prosecutions to make a
showing that the information sought by a subpoena is “highly
material and relevant, necessary or critical to the maintenance
of the claim, and not obtainable from other available sources.”195
Some courts, however, have interpreted Branzburg as explicitly
denying any qualified privilege to reporters subpoenaed in a
grand jury investigation.196
1. Limiting Subpoenas to Protect First Amendment Rights
A Western District of Wisconsin case illustrates how courts
can fashion solutions that balance the government’s need to
obtain information relevant to an investigation while still
protecting First Amendment rights. In In re Grand Jury
Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated 7, 2006 (“Amazon”), Amazon
was subpoenaed by a grand jury to provide the names of 24,000
have consistently read Branzburg as recognizing the First Amendment
interests of reporters in confidentiality and as requiring a judicial balancing
before disclosure is ordered.”); LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134,
1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Justice Powell’s concurrence to explain that the
court must “balance the interest involved” in order to determine “whether the
journalist’s privilege will protect the source in a given situation”); In re Shain,
978 F.2d 850, 854 (4th Cir. 1992) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (citing Justice
Powell’s concurrence when stating that “courts traditionally have balanced the
competing interests of press and prosecution in ruling on a reporter’s motion to
quash”).
194. See, e.g., LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139; Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d
282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 726
(5th Cir.1980); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1980).
195. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983).
196. See, e.g., In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852–53 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[A]bsent
evidence of governmental harassment or bad faith, the reporters have no
privilege different from that of any other citizen not to testify about knowledge
relevant to a criminal prosecution.”); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059,
1090–92 (9th Cir. 1972); McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531–32 (7th Cir.
2003); Storer Communs. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584–85 (6th Cir. 1987); Lee v.
United States Dept. of Justice, 287 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17–18 (D.D.C. 2003).
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users who had purchased books from a seller that was being
investigated for wire fraud and tax evasion.197 Amazon filed a
motion to quash, asserting the First Amendment rights of its
users to not reveal their private reading choices.198 The Western
District of Wisconsin court found these concerns legitimate,
explaining that while the grand jury was not actually interested
in the individual reading habits of the users,
[I]t is an unsettling and un-American scenario to envision federal
agents nosing through the reading lists of law-abiding citizens when
hunting for evidence against somebody else . . . . [R]ational book
buyers would have a non-speculative basis to fear that federal
prosecutors and law enforcement agents have a secondary political
agenda that could come into play when an opportunity presented
itself.199

This fear, the court stressed, could make people less likely
to purchase online books, thereby ensuring that their reading
choices did not end up in government databases.200
While acknowledging that there is no precedent requiring
the government to prove that it has a compelling interest in the
information or that the information is substantially related to
the investigation,201 the Amazon court also noted that the
customers who bought books from the bookseller targeted by the
investigation had First Amendment rights in their private
reading choices.202 After considering both the First Amendment
rights of the customers and the grand jury’s needs, the court
fashioned an alternative to the initial subpoena that better
balanced the interests of the parties.203
The court denied the motion to quash the subpoena, but it
also greatly limited the subpoena’s power and scope by creating
a “filtering mechanism”204 requiring Amazon to send a letter to
a subset of the purchase group, informing them of the

197. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com, 246 F.R.D. 570, 571 (W.D.
Wis. 2007).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 572.
200. Id. (“[A] measurable percentage of people . . . would abandon online
book purchases in order to avoid the possibility of ending up on some sort of
perceived ‘enemies list.’”).
201. Id. at 573.
202. Id. at 572–73.
203. Id. at 573–74.
204. Id. at 573.

120

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

investigation and the limited extent of the customers’ and
Amazon’s responsibilities.205 The letter asked for volunteers to
interview with the government, ensuring that those who chose
not to participate would be left alone and would not have their
identities revealed.206
There are clear parallels between Amazon and Glassdoor,
despite the vastly larger number of individuals the government
was seeking to unmask in Amazon. The Amazon court stressed
that the government was “not entitled to unfettered access to the
identities of even a small sample” of the “group of book buyers
without each book buyer’s permission.”207 And, in both cases, the
government was seeking to identify users who were suspected of
no wrongdoing and were engaging in activities protected by the
First Amendment. Accordingly, the approach used by the
Western District of Wisconsin in Amazon, which provides
government access while also protecting users of online services
from intrusion is instructive for how courts may think about
addressing subpoena challenges in similar cases.
2. Online Associational Privacy Rights
The Ninth Circuit’s assertion that Glassdoor users have no
right to associational privacy is problematic, as it incorrectly
implies that people who wish not to be identified to one another
lack associational privacy rights. One can imagine any number
of scenarios where people would have an interest in associating
without revealing their identities, especially online, where
anonymous association is particularly easy to engage in.
Consider a social media group for people who have a particular
medical condition that they do not wish to publicize. They might
find a sense of community as well as useful information by
communicating with similarly situated people—and there is no
good reason, either constitutionally or logically, to require that

205. Id.
206. Id. at 573–74. In a case raising similar questions, the government
subpoenaed a bookstore for a list of Monica Lewinsky’s purchases as part of its
investigation into her relationship with President Bill Clinton. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc., Nos. 98–MC–135–NHJ, 26 Med.
L. Rptr. 1599, 1600 (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1998). The D.C. District Court recognized
the First Amendment interests that Lewinsky had in her reading choices and
thus required the government to make an in camera showing that its need for
this purchase list was compelling. Id.
207. Id. at 573.
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they unmask themselves in order to obtain the benefits of that
sort of online association.
Similarly, on Glassdoor, users gather to share their
employment experiences with others who have either worked at
the same company or who may be interested in applying. The
fact that they have a shared connection to this company brings
them together. Rather than assume, as the Glassdoor court did,
that users who are anonymous to each other of necessity lack a
right to associational privacy, a better approach is to make that
inquiry on a case-by-case basis, considering the nature of the
platform and the relationship of the users to each other.
Proper recognition of the associational privacy rights of an
online group of people interacting anonymously is important
because those rights are intertwined with their right to speak
anonymously. There will be many instances (including when
posting to Glassdoor, or when participating in the online
community of people who share a particular medical condition
in the example above) in which people will be willing to associate
only because they are able to do so without revealing their
identities. Improperly stripping someone of the right to speak
anonymously can also have the effect of preventing them from
engaging in certain online associations. Put simply, in the online
context, unmasking—including fear of future unmasking—
implicates not only the freedom of expression but also the
freedom of association.
B. UNMASKING IN CIVIL LITIGATION
In our view, both the good faith and motion to dismiss
standards provide too little protection for anonymous speakers,
and therefore should not be used. That leaves the two more
stringent standards: the motion for summary judgment
standard (from Cahill) and the prima facie standard (from
Dendrite). As noted earlier, a key difference between Dendrite
and Cahill is that the former includes a separate balancing
prong that requires the court, after a prima facie showing has
been made, to weigh the interests of the parties, while the latter
does not.208 Paul Alan Levy contends—and we agree—that the
balancing stage is “an important one precisely because it enables
courts to apply the test to a wide range of circumstances while
208. See supra Part III.A.1.
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taking the individualized circumstances of each case into
account.”209 This express balancing step, when properly applied,
ultimately makes Dendrite more protective of anonymous
speech.210
The separate balancing prong under Dendrite allows for a
more thorough inquiry into the reasons for and against
unmasking than what is possible under Cahill’s motion for
summary judgment analysis. When evaluating a motion for
summary judgment, a court draws all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party—in other words, the court must weigh the
evidence presented to determine whether “a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”211 There is some
balancing inherent in that analysis, but not as much as under
Dendrite, in which a court considers not only “the strength of the
prima facie case,”212 but also “the necessity for disclosure of the
anonymous defendant’s identity to allow the plaintiff to properly
proceed”213 and “the defendant’s First Amendment right of
anonymous free speech.”214 Accordingly, the Dendrite standard
still requires a strong evidentiary showing—like that required
under Cahill—but goes further to ensure that the court weighs
the interests of both parties, not just in terms of whether there
is a genuine dispute of material fact that is appropriate for trial,
but also in terms of the potential harms caused by granting or
denying an unmasking request.
There is also the question of what specific factors a court
should consider when performing the balancing test. This is an
area in which no specific court opinion (including Dendrite)
provides broadly applicable guidance. Indeed, a Maryland Court
of Appeals215 judge wrote that balancing, at least in the
defamation context, invites “lower courts to apply, on an ad hoc

209. Paul Alan Levy, Developments in Dendrite, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1,
15 (2012).
210. See Plemons, supra note 14, at 209 (“[C]ourts that utilize the Cahill
approach are far more likely to grant discovery into the speaker’s identity than
those that implement Dendrite.”).
211. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
212. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3775, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001).
213. Id. at 760–61.
214. Id. at 760.
215. The Maryland Court of Appeals is Maryland’s highest court.
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basis, a ‘superlaw’ of Internet defamation that can trump the
well-established defamation law,”216 and therefore may be “an
obstacle to pursuit of legitimate causes of action.”217 However,
the proper response to this concern is not to dispense with a
balancing test altogether but rather to give it structure and
consistency.
Considering the case law in the aggregate, for unmasking
demands arising during discovery,218 we believe that the
following three factors should be analyzed in the balancing test:
(1) the type of anonymous speech at issue, (2) whether the
speaker is a party to the underlying litigation, and (3) the extent
and comparative degree of harm to the parties if the wrong
unmasking decision is made. We explore each of these in turn.219

216. Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 996 A.2d 432, 460 (Md. 2009)
(Adkins, J., concurring).
217. Id. (“The balancing test adopted by the majority accords to a trial court
the authority to decide that a plaintiff’s cause of action for defamation shall not
go forward, even though it meets, on a prima facie basis, all of the common law
requirements, because the court has decided that the defendant’s interests are
greater, on balance, than the plaintiff’s. But the majority grants judges that
discretion.”).
218. Unmasking requests post-judgment can also arise, though they are
uncommon. However, if an unmasking request does arise post-judgement, the
standard established by the Sixth Circuit in Signature Management is a good
model as it fairly balances the interests of the parties. Under Signature
Management, a presumption in favor of unmasking exists “when judgment has
been entered for a plaintiff” similarly to the “general presumption of open
judicial records.” Signature Mgmt. Team v. Doe, 876 F.3d. 831, 837 (6th Cir.
2017). The Sixth Circuit explained that it is important to consider the public’s
interests in the speaker’s identity and the plaintiff’s need to know the speaker’s
identity in order to obtain relief. Id. However, if the anonymous party has
“willingly participated litigation and complied with all relief ordered,” this
weighs against unmasking. Id.
219. An analogy can be drawn between the approach recommended here and
that courts are statutorily required to follow when performing a fair use inquiry
in copyright law. Under the Copyright Act, when evaluating whether the use of
a copyrighted work is a fair use, courts must evaluate “(1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3)
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. §107. While requiring courts to
consider all of these factors, and in the end to make a binary decision (i.e., is the
use fair or not?), the statute leaves courts substantial flexibility in the analysis.
Free Speech Sys., LLC v. Menzel, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(“The doctrine of fair use allows courts flexibility to interpret the copyright
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1. Type of Anonymous Speech
Courts have long recognized that type of anonymous
expression can impact the level of First Amendment protection
it receives. As noted earlier, in 1995 the Supreme Court in
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission wrote that “when a law
burdens core political speech” courts must apply “exacting
scrutiny” and “uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”220 The McIntyre
Court explained that in upholding the decision to punish the
petitioner for posting unsigned leaflets regarding an election,
lower courts had failed to give proper deference to the
importance of anonymous speech on political issues.221 The
Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the scope of the right to
expression is context dependent, writing in 2011 in In re
Anonymous Speakers that “[t]he right to speak, whether
anonymously or otherwise, is not unlimited . . . and the degree
of scrutiny varies depending on the circumstances and the type
of speech at issue.”222 The Ninth Circuit concluded that political
speech receives “the highest level of protection.”223 The Fourth
Circuit has explained that anonymous literary and religious
speech also merit high levels of protection.224
Unmasking challenges in relation to online speech also often
involve questions of whether and to what extent the speech in
question is commercial. It is well settled that, as the Supreme
Court
explained
in
a
1980
decision,
“[t]he
Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial
statute when its strict application would restrict the kind of creativity the
statute intended to encourage.”).
220. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
221. Id.
222. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011).
223. Id.
224. See Lefkoe v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 577 F.3d 240, 248 (4th Cir.
2009) (“Courts have typically protected anonymity under the First Amendment
when claimed in connection with literary, religious, or political speech.”); see
also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002) (holding that a municipal ordinance requiring local residents to
register with the mayor before engaging in canvassing “violated the First
Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech,
and the distribution of handbills”); Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525
U.S. 182, 186 (1999) (explaining that a state statute requiring citizens to “wear
an identification badge” when circulating ballot petitions violated the First
Amendment’s right to free speech).
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speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”225
But there can be divergent views regarding what constitutes
“commercial” speech.
The In re Anonymous Speakers court categorized the
contested speech in the case—a series of online posts about the
plaintiff company that may or may not have been made by the
employees of a rival company—as commercial, but its reasoning
was unclear.226 As Paul Alan Levy argued in a 2012 law review
article, “[p]recedent in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere squarely
rejects the argument that commercial speech includes criticism
of a company, even criticism that someone intends the company’s
customers to see and to harm the company’s business.”227
Approximately six months after the initial ruling, the Ninth
Circuit issued a revised opinion in which it omitted its
explanation for why it considered the speech commercial,
without providing any additional explanation.228
Lack of clarity regarding what constitutes commercial
online anonymous speech is found in decisions from other courts
as well. In fact, different courts can categorize the same type of
speech differently. In In re PGS Home Co. Ltd (2019),229 a
Northern District of California court considered tweets alleging
that the company did its work poorly, did not complete the work
the customer had paid it to do, and did not deal “decently” with
customers.230 The court concluded that the tweets constituted
commercial speech.231 In contrast, in Yelp, Inc. v. Superior
Court,232 a California appellate court concluded that anonymous
Yelp posts in which a customer criticized a company for the

225. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63
(1980).
226. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 611 F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 2010),
opinion withdrawn and superseded, In re Anonymous Online Speakers
(Anonymous II), 661 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011). “The Internet postings and video
at issue in the petition and cross-petition are best described as types of
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience” and are thus properly categorized as commercial speech.” Id.
227. Levy, supra note 209, at 23.
228. In re Anonymous Online Speakers (Anonymous II), 661 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2011).
229. No. 19-mc-80139-JCS, 2019 WL 6311407 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019).
230. Id. at 2.
231. Id. at 9.
232. 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (Cal. Ct. Ap.2017).
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allegedly poor services it provided did not constitute commercial
speech. The Yelp court explained that “the type of ‘commercial
speech’ that is accorded less First Amendment protection is
comprised largely of statements made by those engaged in
commerce relating to their business—not statements made
about them to consumers.”233 This illustrates that a categorybased approach to choosing unmasking standards can be
frustrated by inconsistencies in how courts categorize speech.
There is also a circular logic problem that arises in tailoring
unmasking approaches to whether or not the speech in question
is commercial, since answering that question may require
knowing who is doing the speaking. The Ninth Circuit
considered this question in SI03, Inc. v. Bodybuilding.com,
LLC,234 vacating and remanding a district court’s denial of a
motion to compel unmasking because the district court had
“assessed . . . [the] motion without knowledge of the speakers’
identities” and thus could not accurately categorize the
contested speech.235 The Ninth Circuit proposed a problematic,
paradoxical, and procedurally burdensome alternative involving
proceeding with the unmasking first, sharing the resulting
information with plaintiff’s counsel, and then performing an
inquiry to determine if that information should be further made
available; e.g., to the plaintiff and the public record.236 Given the
spotty record that courts have of maintaining the confidentiality
of supposedly sealed filings and the risk that some plaintiff’s
attorneys, confidentiality obligations notwithstanding, might
convey or suggest the identity of the defendant to their clients,
such an approach would chill online anonymous speech if widely
adopted.237

233. Id. at 896 (emphasis in original).
234. 441 F. App’x 431 (9th Cir. 2011).
235. Id. at 432.
236. Id. The court wrote that some further disclosure may be necessary “in
order to resolve the underlying issue of the speakers’ relationship to [the
plaintiff] and the corresponding nature of their speech.” Id. at 432 n.1. The court
instructed the trial court to fashion procedural safeguards (e.g., only revealing
the identity of the anonymous speaker to the plaintiff’s attorney) in order to
ostensibly protect the anonymous speaker while allowing the case to move
forward. Id.
237. It is also worth noting that some types of speech (e.g., copyright
infringement) receive no protection at all. But even here there can be circularity
challenges if there is some question regarding whether the speech is really

2022] ANONYMOUS EXPRESSION AND “UNMASKING”

127

In light of the above, the type of speech should weigh against
unmasking if the speech is political, literary, or religious, and in
favor of unmasking if the speech is commercial. However,
considering the potential difficulty of ascertaining the nature of
the speech without knowing the identity of the speaker, and the
general inconsistencies with how speech is categorized, courts
should err on the side of caution when making determinations
about the nature of speech. Thus, this factor should weigh
against unmasking if there is uncertainty or if determining the
nature of the speech would itself require identifying the speaker.
2. Party or Nonparty
The next factor considers whether the speaker whose
identity is sought is a party to the litigation. Unmasking a nonparty may be critical to resolving a case—for example, if the nonparty’s testimony would be important in proving (or disproving)
the allegations at issue. Consider the following example: Person
A posts under a pseudonym on social media that he went to
lunch at a particular restaurant and got serious food poisoning
that started almost immediately after the meal. Person B
responds to Person A’s post, also under a pseudonym, saying
“He’s not telling the truth—I was with him for hours after that
meal and he was fine.” The restaurant owner believes Person A
is lying and files a defamation complaint.
This a case where the testimony of Person B could be vital
to fact-finding, and where the unmasking to allow that to
occur—and that the plaintiff would certainly seek—would need
to be of someone not a party to the litigation. Despite the
potential importance of Person B’s testimony, our view is that,
as a non-party not accused of any wrongdoing, Person B should
benefit from a higher hurdle to unmasking than Person A.
Some courts238 facing plaintiff demands to unmask a nonparty have followed the Doe v. 2TheMart approach—which

unprotected. For instance, a person who posts copyrighted content in a manner
protected by fair use has a right to make the posting anonymously. But a
defendant might find it hard to convince a court that the posting qualifies as
fair use without providing identifying information that would amount to
unmasking.
238. See, e.g., Rich v. Butowsky, No. 20-mc-80081-DMR, 2020 WL 5910069
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020) (“The court finds 2TheMart.com persuasive for this issue
and will refer to it for guidance.”); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF,
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requires that the identifying information is sought in good faith,
“relates to and is directly and materially relevant to the claim or
defense,” and is unavailable elsewhere.239 However, this sets the
bar too low, as it permits unmasking of an anonymous speaker
whose testimony might be “directly and materially relevant,” but
not necessary, to fact-finding (even information that is
unavailable elsewhere may not be necessary to prove the
asserted claim). When deciding whether to order unmasking, a
better approach is for courts to examine the potential role of the
anonymous non-party’s testimony in light of the other
evidentiary information, as well as the chilling effect and
resulting broader harms that might result from the unmasking.
This analysis will be highly context-dependent. For instance,
unmasking an anonymous online speaker whose statements
support an accusation regarding a claim of relatively minor
harm might then disincentivize future speakers from speaking
anonymously and whose later testimony might prove vital to
resolving accusations of major harms.
3. Comparative Harms
The third factor examines the comparative potential harms
to a party if an improper unmasking decision is made. This can
occur if a court declines to allow unmasking of a defendant who
engaged in tortious conduct, as well as if a court allows
unmasking of a defendant who did not engage in tortious
conduct. Consider, for example, a restaurant owner who files a
defamation claim against an anonymous Yelp reviewer who
claims that he or she was dramatically overcharged for a recent
meal. If, as alleged by the restaurant owner, the reviewer’s
claims are false, then a court decision to deny unmasking will
leave the restaurant owner with little recourse—unable to get
the defamatory post(s) removed or to seek monetary damages.
The most the owner can do is to respond to the post and hope
that prospective customers will believe the owner’s side of the
2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (relying on the 2TheMart.com test to
quash plaintiff’s motion to compel); Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:08-CV1934, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008) (applying the 2TheMart.com
test to deny plaintiff’s motion to compel on the grounds that information was
available from alternate sources); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 952 (D.C.
2009) (applying 2TheMart.com test).
239. Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(outlining the standard a party must meet to compel the unmasking of an
anonymous speaker who is not a party to the litigation).
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story. On the other hand, a court decision to unmask a reviewer
whose claims are accurate would violate that reviewer’s
constitutional right to speak anonymously.
While both types of wrong unmasking decision are
problematic, they might cause different relative levels of harm.
To explore this, consider two scenarios. First, if the restaurant
has a long history of many complaints regarding overcharging
from many different reviewers, the marginal harm to the
restaurant owner of the defendant’s review is lower regardless
of its accuracy. In this scenario, a court might conclude that the
potential harm to the defendant that would arise through an
incorrect decision in favor of unmasking (i.e., allowing
unmasking and then finding that the review was accurate) is
higher than the potential harm to the plaintiff arising from an
incorrect decision denying the unmasking demand.
For the second scenario, suppose that, other than from the
anonymous reviewer named as the defendant, the restaurant
has a history of receiving exclusively glowing reviews. In this
scenario, a court might allocate heightened importance to
determining the accuracy of the review(s) cited in the complaint,
and proceed to authorize the unmasking. While the potential
harm of an incorrect decision for the plaintiff might be the same
regardless of whether the overcharging accusations in an
accurate negative review were consistent with other reviews of
the restaurant, the potential harm to the defendant of failing to
authorize the unmasking is much higher. Thus, in a relative
sense, this second scenario would weigh more heavily in favor of
unmasking than the first.
V. CONCLUSIONS
With anonymous online postings now a major component of
the digital ecosystem, the issue of unmasking will arise with
increasing frequency in both civil litigation and criminal
investigations and prosecutions. With respect to civil litigation,
this Article has argued that the current patchwork of caselaw is
inconsistent, provides insufficiently clear guidance, and often
fails to adequately consider the expression rights of anonymous
online speakers.
The Article thus proposes an approach that adopts the
prima facie burden of Dendrite with respect to the requisite
evidentiary showing by a party seeking unmasking, but also
goes further in articulating a specific balancing test including
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three factors: (1) the type of anonymous speech at issue, (2)
whether the speaker is a party to the underlying litigation, and
(3) the extent and comparative degree of harm to the parties if
the wrong unmasking decision is made. This framework offers
the advantage of being flexible and adaptable, and avoids the
challenge of attempting to create a one-size-fits-all standard that
will inevitably prove inadequate given the tremendous variety
of factual circumstances encountered in unmasking cases.
The Article has also considered unmasking in grand jury
investigations, arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s Glassdoor
decision—which requires only that a grand jury investigation be
carried out in good faith when determining whether to unmask
online speakers who have published statements of interest to the
grand jury—sets too low a bar. Establishing that a grand jury is
acting in good faith should be a necessary but not sufficient
condition in relation to unmasking. Additionally, the Glassdoor
decision incorrectly failed to recognize that online users can have
associational privacy rights despite being anonymous to one
another. In combination, these factors indicate that courts
should follow the Western District of Wisconsin’s approach in
Amazon by fashioning subpoenas in such a way that gives grand
juries access to information necessary for their investigations
while still protecting the First Amendment rights of the
anonymous online speakers these grand juries seek to unmask.

